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November 25, 1996
Abstract:   This paper derives, estimates, and analyzes a multi-factor model of the monthly
holding period returns on the stocks of exchange-traded financial institutions. In addition
to bond and equity returns, the factors include default, liquidity, and term structure risk
premiums plus variables that measure changes in deposit demand. To ensure that our
sample has a large number of firms, we use data from January 1981 through December
1988. The equity return explains a large share of time-series variation in financial
institutions’ returns. The additional factors implied by banking theory have little
incremental explanatory power. The two-factor model regression coefficients have
considerable cross-sectional variation. This permits us to group banks into portfolios with
similar risk exposures. These portfolios bear no relation to the SIC codes that group banks
by their charters and lines of business.1
A Market-Based Risk Classification of Financial Institutions
1.0 Introduction
A divergence exists between banking theory and banking econometrics. Banking
theorists address the question of why banks are special. Two widely accepted answers are
that banks reduce default and liquidity risks.
1 Empirical studies of banks’ stock returns
document the statistical significance of the two-factor model. One factor is the rate of
return on the market portfolio, and the other factor is the return on a debt instrument.
2
While market and debt returns may be related to default and liquidity risks, their links have
not been established. Consequently, we have banking theories that have not been closely
tied to time series data, and banking evidence that has not been explicitly related to
banking theory.
To reduce the gap between theory and evidence, we develop and estimate a model
of the realized rate of return an investor receives from holding a financial institution’s
stock. The model includes the two-factor model as a special case. We use the results to
provide evidence on three questions. First, we test for the effects of six types of risks on
returns. For the most part, neither the default, liquidity, term structure, and deposit
demand risk variables are significant. Only the equity return is consistently significant
across banks. Second, we decompose the rate of return into an expected return and three
different types of surprises. We estimate the additional return that stockholders demand
for each type of risk exposure. We also estimate the effects of unexpected changes in
economic conditions on banks’ returns. Third, we examine differences in these effects
across banks. A bank determines it’s exposure to each of these risks by the compositions
of its assets and liabilities, the off-balance sheet financial services it provides, and its
hedging activities.
3 Banks differ greatly in their risk exposures, and their exposures are not
closely related to the SIC-classifications of financial institutions. We group banks
according to their estimated risk exposures.
                                                       
1 Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) summarize much of the literature on this question.
2 Neuberger (1991) summarizes and references many of the two-factor studies.
3 We use bank generically to refer to banks and other financial institutions.2
2.0 Framework
The value at date t, Vt, of a bank’s expected perpetual cash flow, p , which it pays










Here, kt is the risk-adjusted, expected rate of return for the expected cash flow stream,
Et( ) p .
When investors receive news that changes their estimate of the bank profits, or its
cost of capital, they change their reservation price for the bank’s stock. This changes the
realized holding period rate of return, ht+1, that the date-t equity investor at receives at
date t+1. The holding period return is the sum of the realized cash distribution plus the
change in the bank’s value relative to its beginning-of-period value. Its realized
distribution is its expected distribution plus the unexpected change in its current period
cash flow. Its percent change in its value is the change in its expected profits minus the
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We next develop a relationship between each component of the holding period rate
of return and variables that are exogenous to the bank. We then find data for the
exogenous variables and estimate their effects on the bank’s returns.
2.1 The bank’s equity cash flow.
We model a bank as a price-taker in asset markets, and in its off-balance sheet
activities, and a price-setter in the deposit market. It starts with Bt dollars of paid-in
capital. At date t, the beginning of period t, it sets its deposit rate, rd,t, to maximize its
expected cash flow to equity. Savers compare this rate to the rate they can receive on
deposit substitutes and allocate their savings between banks and securities. This
determines the bank’s deposits, Dt, and its interest expense. The bank uses these deposits
                                                       
4 Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use this approach. See also Campbell, et al. (1997). The approximation is
based on the ratio of  kt+1 to kt being close to one.3
plus its capital to fund its assets, which consist of fixed-rate assets, Ft, and adjustable-rate
assets, At.
A F D B t t t t + = + (3)
The bank splits its assets between fixed- and adjustable-rate assets to maximize its
interest revenue net of operating costs. The fixed-rate asset yields rF t , , and the adjustable-
rate yields ra,t. Its off-balance sheet services, St, consist of origination, servicing, hedging,
and transaction services with market price st per unit. It has operating costs, C, which
depend on the quantities of its off-balance sheet activities and its assets. At date t, the
bank’s expected cash flow to equity to be delivered at date  t+1 is
5
E E s S E r A r F r D C S A F t t t t t t a t t F t t d t t t t t ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) , , , p + + + = + + - - 1 1 1 (4)
The bank chooses the quantity of off-balance sheet activities it is willing to supply and its
deposit rate to maximize its expected equity cash flow.










































                                                       
5 This is based on Santomero’s (1984) survey of models of banks.4
The two first-order conditions can be solved separately. Equation (5) shows that the bank
supplies off-balance sheet activities in the quantity for which its marginal cost equals the
market price of the service. Equation (6) shows that the cash-flow-maximizing deposit
rate depends on the rate the bank earns on its adjustable-rate assets less its marginal
operating costs less a term that represents interest expense sensitivity to the deposit rate.
To solve this for the optimal deposit rate we must first state expressions for deposit
demand and its derivative.
6
2.2 Demand for deposits
Friedman and Roley (1987) study the conditions that give rise to asset demands
that are linear in expected returns and homogeneous in wealth, W. If depositors have
constant relative risk aversion, if the deposit rate is risk-free, and if the rate on a deposit
substitute, rs, is normally distributed, the expected utility maximizing deposit demand is
D r E r W t d t t s t t = + - + { [ ( )]} , , a a 0 1 1 . (8)
Deposit demand increases with the deposit rate, decreases with the rate on the deposit
substitute, and increases with households’ wealth. The coefficients a 0 and a1depend on
depositors’ risk aversions, and the variance of the return on the deposit substitute. A
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2.3. The optimized cash flow.
Substitute the deposit demand equation (8) and its derivative (9) into the first
order condition (6), and solve for the equity-cash-flow-maximizing, market-equilibrium
deposit rate. It is
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The optimal deposit rate increases with the expected rate of return the bank can earn on its
assets, and on the expected interest rate that depositors can earn on substitutes for the
bank’s deposits. It decreases with marginal operating costs of servicing assets.
Substitute the expression for the optimal deposit rate (10) back into the deposit
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Deposit demand increases with the rate the bank earns on its assets net of its additional
operating costs, decreases with the rate depositors can earn on deposit substitutes, and
increases with wealth.
The purpose of the analysis thus far is to identify the exogenous variables that
determine the bank’s optimal equity-cash-flow. To this end, substitute the expression for
the optimal deposit rate (10) and the expression for equilibrium deposit demand (11) into
the cash flow equation (4).
7 This gives
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7 Without specifying a functional form for the cost function, we cannot get a closed-form solution for the
optimal quantity of fixed-rate assets.6
(12)
The exogenous variables in the optimized cash-flow-function (12) are the market-
determined fees for each of the bank’s off-balance sheet services, the interest rates the
bank earns on its assets, the rates that banks’ competitors pay on substitutes for bank
deposits, and the aggregate wealth of savers. We use equation (12) in conjunction with
equation (2) to analyze cross-sectional variation in banks’ returns.
2.4. Effects of exogenous variables on the bank’s expected cash flow
According to the holding period rate of return equation (2), if realized cash flows
differ from expected cash flows, if expected cash flows change, or if the bank’s cost of
capital changes, the bank’s realized rate of return differs from its expected rate of return.
The total derivative of the optimized cash-flow function gives an expression that
explains changes in the bank’s expected cash flow that occur between date t and date t+1.
We assume that the bank responds optimally to these changes, and implements its
responses at date t+1 which is the beginning of the next period. We assume that investors
are aware of the changes and the bank’s optimal responses to them. Investors revise their
expectations of the bank’s expected cash flow from date t+1 forward, and trade the
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We use (12) to derive expressions for each of the partial derivatives in (13). We
then analyze these expressions to predict cross-sectional variations in banks’ responses to
changes in the exogenous variables. This analysis assumes that each bank optimally adjusts
to changes in the exogenous variables.7
2.4.1. Effects of changes in the price of off-balance sheet services
Consider first the price of off-balance sheet services that banks supply. Their effect












































If banks supply off-balance services in competitive markets, equation (5) requires that the
price of each service equals its marginal cost, so the second term on the right-hand-side is
zero. Thus, the change in the expected cash flow due to a change in the demand for off-
balance sheet services equals the quantity of the service supplied by the bank. Banks differ
in the amounts of each service they supply, and a single bank can change the amounts of
services it supplies from one month to the next. To the extent that banks differ in the types
and quantities of off-balance sheet services they supply, their returns will show different
responses to changes in the prices of these services. We allow for these effects in our
ensuing regression. However, since we do not allow our regression coefficients to change
over the sample period, we are implicitly assuming that a bank does not make significant
changes in the quantity of each service that it supplies.
Since we do not have data on service prices, we relate service price changes to
changes in service demands. If demand increases, the price of the service increases above
the average cost of supplying it and banks’ cash flow increases. This lasts until banks
collectively increase their supply of the service, and drive its price down to average cost. If
demand decreases, the service price decreases below average cost and banks decrease
production using their current facilities. With price less than average costs, some banks
quit supplying the service and price rises until it equals average cost.
2.4.2. Effects of changes in returns on adjustable-rate assets
8
                                                       
8 A similar analysis holds for changes in the return on the fixed-rate asset.8
The next expression gives the response of the bank’s expected cash flow to a
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The first term on the right-hand-side,  At+1
* , is the change in interest revenue from
adjustable-rate assets that the bank already owns. The second term, the term in braces, is
the change in net interest revenue from new assets. When the interest rate that a bank can
earn on an asset changes, the bank responds by changing the rate they pay on their
deposits. This leads depositors to change their deposit holdings. If an asset’s return rises,
the bank raises its deposit rate and gains more deposits. It allocates this new money
between fixed- and adjustable-rate assets. It earns additional interest revenue on the new
assets but incurs additional interest expense and has higher operating costs.
Banks differ in the fractions of their assets that are adjustable-rate as compared to
fixed-rate, in how their costs respond to changes in activity, and how their depositors
respond to changes in their deposit rates. These differences cause cross-sectional
variations in the responses of banks’ cash flows and returns to exogenous changes in the
adjustable-interest rate.
2.4.3. Effects of changes in returns on deposit substitutes
When interest rates on assets that are substitutes for deposits change, the bank
loses some deposits. This changes its interest expense. It responds by changing the rate it
pays on deposits. This changes its deposit holdings with commensurate changes in its






























































































If banks differ in their market power in deposit markets, or in their operating costs, they
have different responses to changes in rates paid on deposit substitutes.
2.4.4. Effects of changes in wealth
An increase in wealth increases deposit demand. The bank earns additional interest
revenue on these new deposits but also incurs higher interest and operating expenses. The
bank optimally responds by reducing the interest rate they pay on deposits. The term in
braces on the right-hand-side of the following expression gives the increase in net interest
revenue from increased deposits at the previously optimal deposit rate, and the second























































































Banks display cross-sectional variation in their responses to changes in wealth due
to differences in their operating costs, and in how savers allocate their wealth between
deposits and deposit-substitutes.
2.5. Surprises in the bank’s cash flow
Surprises differ from changes in expectations in that the bank is unable to respond
optimally to surprises. Conditional on its forecasts of the exogenous variables, the bank
makes its value-maximizing investment, financing, dividend and operating decisions at the
beginning of each period. After the bank has made its decisions, the exogenous variables
can take on values different from their expected values. We assume that the bank is unable10
to change its decisions in response to these surprises. We use the optimized cash-flow
equation to derive the effects of surprises on the bank’s actual cash flow.
2.5.1. Effects of surprises in the price of off-balance sheet services
Partially differentiate equation (12) with respect to the price of off-balance sheet















Compare the responses of the bank’s cash flow to changes in the actual and expected
prices of off-balance sheet services. The bank’s date t supply of financial services
determines the response of its cash flow to a surprise in the price of financial services. In
contrast, the bank’s date t+1 supply of services determines how a change in the expected
price of services affects its cash flow. These responses differ by the change in the optimal
supply of services between date I and date t+1. Thus, in principle, the response varies
through time. In our empirical work we allow the responses to differ across banks, but
require them to be constant through time for each group of banks.
2.5.2. Effects of surprises in the adjustable-rate















The bank receives the actual adjustable-rate, not the expected rate. Its revenues change in
an amount equal to its holding of these assets times the change in their rate. Surprise
changes in asset returns have smaller effects on cash flows than do changes in expected11
returns. This is because the bank is unable to respond optimally to surprises, but responds
optimally to changes in expected returns.
2.5.3. Effects of surprises in the fixed-rate














Surprises in the fixed rate have no effect on the bank’s current cash flow as rF,t+1 does not
enter equation (12) for the bank’s cash flow. Equation (20) is what we mean by a fixed-
rate asset. It is one whose return is deterministic over the period.
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Banks forecast the rate they expect their competitors to pay on deposit substitutes. On the
basis of this forecast and forecasts of the other exogenous variables, banks set their
deposit rate. Their forecast can be wrong. We assume that savers, but not the bank,
optimally respond to a change in the rate that banks’ competitors pay on deposit
substitutes. If the rate rises, savers buy more of the substitute and less deposits. This
reduces the bank’s deposits, the quantity of assets it can fund, its interest expense and its
interest revenue net of operating costs. Since net revenue exceeds the deposit rate, the
bank’s cash flow decreases.12































[ ( ) ] . , ,
* (22)
A change in wealth changes savers’ demands for deposits. If wealth increases,
deposit demand increases. The bank allocates the deposits between adjustable- and fixed-
rate assets. Its interest revenue, operating costs, and deposit expenses all increase. Their
net effect is to increase the bank’s cash flow.
2.6. Changes in the cost of capital
The two-factor model relates the bank’s cost of equity capital to the expected
return on the market portfolio of stocks, E r t m t ( ) , +1 , and the expected holding period return
on default-free bonds, E r t B t ( ) , +1 . In addition, we add premiums for default risk, liquidity
risk, and term structure risk. Risk exposure has a two-pronged effect on a bank’s financial
performance. If the bank properly charges its customers for managing risk, its expected
cash flow rises with its risk bearing. But, so does its cost of capital as its stockholders
demand to be compensated for the risk they bear. A bank that intentionally increases its
risk exposure and properly charges for risk management will not have a change in its
market value.
Each risk premium is the product of the bank’s risk exposure to the ith type of
risk, b i, times the market price of that type of risk, li .  The bank’s equity cost of capital
at date t, the beginning of the holding period, is
k E r E r t t m t t B t i
i
i t = + + + +




Each component of the cost of capital can change over the holding period from
date t to date t+1.  To be able to estimate the bank’s risk exposures, we assume the bank’s13
risk exposures, the bs, are constant over the sample period.  The next equation gives the
effects of changes in the exogenous components on the bank’s cost of capital.
dk dE r dE r d t t m t t B t i i t
i
+ + + + + +
=
= + +￿ 1 1 2 1 2 1
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3
( ) ( ) , , , b l . (24)
2.7. Summary of factors affecting the bank’s rate of return
The various factors influencing a bank’s holding period return is summarized in the
following equation.
h E r E r
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The realized rate of return equals the expected rate of return, kt, plus unexpected changes
in the bank’s profits over the period due to forecast errors in the exogenous variables, plus
news about future expected profits, minus news about the bank’s cost of capital.
We can condense the expression for the bank’s realized equity rate of return by
noting that the same exogenous factors affect the bank’s loan rate, and investors’ required
return on the bank’s equity. Each of these rates is the sum of a risk-free rate plus risk
premiums.
The loan rate equals the risk-free rate plus premiums for the default risk of the
borrower, the illiquidity of the loan, and perhaps a term premium to compensate the lender
for term structure risk. Each premium is the product of the risk of the loan and the market
price of that type of risk.
E r r t a t f t d d t l l t T T t ( ) , , , , , + = + + + 1 b l b l b l (26)14
Substituting (26) into equation (25) gives the regression equation that explains the
realized rate of return on the bank’s stock.
h E r E r
V s r r W
E dE s dr dE r dW
k dE r dE r
E
t t m t t B t i
i
i t
t s t a a t r s t W t
t s t t a f t r t s t W t






+ + + +
-
+ + + + + +
-
+ + + +
» + +
+ + - +
+ + - +
- +
+




1 1 1 1
1
1 2 1 1 2 2
1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]








a e a e a e a e
p a a a a
e e e e
( ) ] ]
*












The first row on the right-hand-side is the expected rate of return that investors require at
date t, the beginning of the month, to hold the bank’s stock until date t+1, the end of the
month. The remaining terms represent unexpected changes in the rate of return. The
second row is the unexpected change in the bank’s cash flow between date t and t+1 due
to errors that investors made in forecasting the variables that drive the cash flow. The third
row shows the effects of changes that occur during period t in the expected values of the
exogenous variables that drive cash flows. The fourth row is the effect of changes in the
bank’s cost of capital that occur during period t. The last row shows the effects of
variables that affect the bank’s rate of return through both cash flows and the cost of
capital. These are changes in the market premiums for default risk, liquidity risk, and term
structure risk.
3.0. Data
To form our data set we searched Compustat for all firms with SIC codes between
6000 and 6299. These include commercial banks and deposit institutions, non-deposit
credit institutions, and organizations involved in security trading. For the time period
January 1981 through December 1988 we found 64 firms with stock that traded on either15
the NYSE or AMEX and 117 firms whose stock was traded on the NASDAQ.
9 We
excluded one stock from the NYSE sample because it was an ADR. We obtained each
firm’s daily holding period return including any distribution from the CRSP daily return
file. We removed a firm from the data set if the number of missing returns in any month
exceeded 20 percent of the trading days in the month. This criterion led us to remove one
of the NYSE/AMEX firms and 12 of the NASDAQ firms. This left us with 167 firms: 124
commercial banks, 15 savings institutions, 5 non-deposit credit institutions, 11 security
brokers and investment advisers, and 12 others. For each of these firms we compounded
their daily returns into monthly returns.
Table 1 reports how we measure each of the regressors.
4.0. Empirical Results
4.1. Procedures
We conducted our empirical analysis in four steps. First, to align the data with the
theoretical model of returns, we estimated an ARIMA model for each regressor using
monthly data over the five years from 1976 through 1980.
10 We reestimated the
coefficients of the model each month using the last five years of data up to that month.
11
We use the predicted values, their forecast errors, and the changes in the predicted values
as the empirical measures of the theoretical variables in equation (27). Second, we
estimated the rate of return equation (27) for each firm in the data set. Third, we use a
portfolio approach to conduct hypothesis tests. We entered the estimated regression
coefficients into SAS’s version of Ward’s minimum-variance-clustering procedure and
grouped the firms into ten clusters. Fourth, for each cluster we formed an equally-
weighted portfolio of the returns on the firms in the cluster. We then regressed each
portfolio return on the regressors in equation (27).
                                                       
9 When we extended our sample period past the end of 1988, we lost many banks from the sample because
of bank mergers and acquisitions.
10 We also estimated an ARIMA model for each regressor using data from 1981-1988. The results do not
change significantly.
11 We do not allow the structure of the ARIMA process to change each month. We only permit the
coefficients of the model to change.16
4.2. Hypothesis tests
Our main concern in this paper is to test whether the variables representing default,
liquidity, term structure, and deposit demand risks have incremental explanatory power for
banks’ returns.
12 We start with the two-factor model that previous researchers have found
describes returns to banks’ stockholders.
13 In our setup, the two-factor model has six
regressors.
14 For each factor we enter its predicted value, its forecast error, and the
change in its predicted value. Table 2 reports the results. The prediction error in the CRSP
return is the only regressor that is significant in each of the ten portfolios.
15 It explains a
significant portion of the portfolio returns for all ten portfolios. Financial institutions have
heterogeneous responses to the CRSP-return prediction error. Coefficients range from a
low of 0.8 to a high of 1.5.
To test the multi-factor model of banks’ returns, we add 13 additional regressors
which comprise four variables to measure changes in deposit demand, three to represent
default risk, three for liquidity risk, and three for term structure risk.
16 We reestimate the
regression coefficients for each bank, cluster the banks into ten new portfolios, and
reestimate the multi-factor model for each portfolio. Table 3 reports the estimates. A
visual examination of the table shows that the CRSP prediction error is strongly significant
for each portfolio, and the components of the bond return are significant in only four
portfolios. The additional factors are infrequently significant.
Our main result, reported in Table 4, is a test of hypothesis 1, H1. As a group the
thirteen additional regressors are significant in only three portfolios at a p-value of 10
percent or less.
17 The multi-factor model of banks’ returns adds little to the two-factor
model. For all of the portfolios, see H2, the two-factor regressors are strongly significant
in the presence of the additional factors. This suggests that the two-factor model, not the
                                                       
12 We are particulary interested in these variables because these are the risks that banks manage for the
economy. See the readings in James and Smith (1994) and the discussion in Greenbaum and Thakor
(1995).
13 See Neuberger, op. cit.
14 Our model nests the standard two-factor model.
15 The predicted value of the CRSP and bond returns from our ARIMA models are poor predictors of the
actual returns. Consequently, the forecast errors are approximately the monthly changes in the returns.
16 The 20-year bond return may also represent some of the interest rate risk.
17 Portfolios 9 and 10 contain 2 and 1 firms respectively. We do not view their results as informative.17
default-cum-credit-cum-term structure-cum-deposit risk model, should be the benchmark
model of banks’ returns. Banking theory has little explanatory power for financial
institutions’ returns over a general two-factor model that applies to nonfinancial firms.
We next ask whether we can eliminate any of the thirteen regressors to obtain a
simpler empirical model of banks’ returns. A prime theoretical possibility is that banks’
returns are explained by just their expected returns. To test this we drop all regressors
except for the predicted values of the CRSP return, the bond return, and the premiums for
default, liquidity, and term structure risk, see H3. All ten portfolios reject this hypothesis.
The components of expected holding period returns do not explain banks’ stock returns.
At the other extreme, we drop all the regressors that represent surprises, see H4.
The surprise regressors are the prediction errors and the changes in the predicted
regressors. The data reject this hypothesis for all ten portfolios. Surprises in the factors,
primarily the equity-return surprise, explain most of the variation in banks’ returns.
We now test sets of regressors as they are organized in equation (27). The first line
of equation (27) contains regressors that represent the expected holding period return on
the portfolio of banks’ stocks. Hypothesis 5, H5, tests whether we can drop these
variables. We can for seven of the ten portfolios at a p-value of 10 percent. This reinforces
the finding from H3. Expected holding period returns explain little of realized returns. The
second and third lines of equation (27) show the effects of cash flow surprises on returns.
Hypothesis 6, H6, asks if we can drop these regressors. The answer is yes for eight of the
ten portfolios at a p-value of 10 percent. Investors pay little attention to cash flow
surprises in setting prices for banks’ stocks. Finally, hypothesis 7, H7, asks whether we
can drop the regressors in lines four and five of equation (27). These are the surprises in
the cost of capital and risk premiums. The answer is no for five of the ten portfolios at a
10 percent p-value. Cost of capital surprises explain most of the variations in banks’
returns. Surprises in the CRSP return are the most important component of cost of capital
surprises.
4.2. Portfolio Results18
Because the multi-factor model does not have significant incremental explanatory
power over the two-factor model, we use the two-factor results in Table 2 to study cross-
sectional differences in banks’ returns.
18 To interpret the results it is useful to review the
dating of the components of the return variables. We imagine an investor at date t
allocating his or her money between bank stocks and other assets. Their trades set date-t
equity prices. The higher these prices, the lower is the rate of return during the month
beginning at date t and ending at date t+1. During the period, investors receive news that
causes them to revise their date t+1 expectation of banks’ returns. If they revise upward
their expectations, they bid up the date t+1 prices of banks’ stocks. This raises the holding
period rate of return from date  t to date t+1.
Bond returns have little or no effect on portfolios 1, 2, 3, and 5. These portfolios
contain 100 of our sample of 167 firms. A single-factor, equity-return model explains time
series variations in these firms’ returns. Investors appear to have considered these financial
institutions to have been duration balanced. Bond returns, in varying degrees, affect the
other six portfolios which contain the remaining 67 firms.
The coefficients of the change in the predicted bond return are all negative. If bond
returns increased over the last five years, our ARIMA model predicts them to increase
next month.
19 For expected bond returns to increase, bond yields must fall by a larger
amount than they fell in the past. Our results show that when investors expect a large
decrease in bond yields they bid up the prices of banks’ stocks. This causes the date t
holding period return to increase. Based on the negative sign of the coefficient of the
change in the predicted bond return, investors viewed the banks in portfolios 4 and 7 as
being long-funded.
If bond yields fall unexpectedly during month t, bond returns rise unexpectedly
during the month. Investors bid up the prices of the banks in portfolios 4, 6, and 7. This is
consistent with investors viewing these banks as being long-funded.
Predicted bond returns affect the banks in portfolios 8, 9, and 10. These portfolios
contain only seven banks in total. If bond returns have been high for the past five years,
                                                       
18 The appendix reports the firms in each of the ten portfolios.
19 The change in the predicted bond return is approximately the change in the average bond return for the
five years ending at date  t+1 minus the average bond return for the five years ending at date  t.19
their predicted return for the current month is high.
20 For past returns to have been high,
yields must have fallen. If the predicted return is high, the predicted yield is falling. All
significant coefficients of the predicted bond returns are negative. Thus, banks’ returns are
positively related to expected changes in bond yields. Investors must view the banks in
portfolios 8, 9, and 10 as being long funded. When investors expect yields to fall, they bid
up the prices of these banks and bid down their returns. Investors must think that a fall in
yields is bad for these banks. This is the case if the banks are long-funded.
Because the coefficients in our ARIMA model of the CRSP return are
insignificant, the predicted CRSP return is its average value over the five years prior to
date t. The prediction error in the CRSP return is approximately the difference between
the actual return and its previous five-year average. Since the average changes slowly, the
prediction error behaves approximately as the actual return. All prediction error
coefficients are significantly positive. When investors receive news that causes them to bid
up the prices of the stocks in the CRSP index, this news also causes them to bid up the
prices of banks’ stocks. We do not know what this news is. But, based on our finding that
the additional factors do not explain variation in banks’ returns, they do not seem to be
news-worthy variables for investors to attempt to anticipate.
5.0 Comparison with Standard Industrial Classifications
Financial intermediaries provide a variety of financial services to savers and
investors: they reduce the costs of searching for counterparties; they value assets and
liabilities; they report prices which aids the price discovery process; they monitor
borrowers; they provide denomination and maturity intermediation; they eliminate
unsystematic risk through diversification; they hedge their own risks and manage the risks
of others; they provide liquidity; and they provide the payment system.  In providing these
services banks are exposed to a variety of risks.  Their exposures to these risks provides a
way to categorize banks.
                                                       
20 The ARIMA model for bond returns has a positive, but insignificant moving-average term. The
predicted bond return is approximately the average bond return over the past five years.20
Banks can also be categorized by their regulatory status. In principle, the economic
and regulatory categories should be related as regulations attempt to restrict the assets and
liabilities that banks can issue and own, and their off-balance sheet activities. A bank’s
balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities determines its risk exposures and the return
that investors require to own the bank’s stock. In practice, regulatory classifications do
not provide an accurate description of banks’ economic activities as reflected in their risk
exposures. Table 5 compares the SIC classifications of banks with our risk-based
classifications. There are no discernible patterns between risk and charter category.
6.0 Conclusions
The equity return explains a large share of the time series variation in financial
institutions’ monthly stock returns. The holding period return on long-term treasury bonds
has incremental explanatory power for 67 of the firms in our sample of 100. Financial
institutions display considerable cross-sectional variation in their responses to these
factors. These responses bear little relation to their SIC classification. Financial
institutions’ returns show little response to premiums for liquidity, default, term structure
risk, and deposit demand risks. Financial institutions have immunized their values against
risks not captured by the equity premium. From an investor’s risk perspective, financial
firms are little different from non-financial firms.
Risk exposure has a two-pronged effect on a bank’s financial performance. If the
bank charges its customers for managing their risks, its expected cash flows rise with the
amount of risk it bears. But, so does its cost of capital as stockholders demand
compensation for bearing risk. A bank that increases its risk exposure and charges the
market risk premium will not have a change in its value. Our results are consistent with
banks being astute risk managers. Astuteness can explain why their returns are not
affected by changes in risk premiums.21
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Our regression equation, be it a two-factor model or a multi-factor model, serves
as a basis for producing the clustering result. First, we estimate the coefficients of the
model for an individual bank using a time-series of stock returns over 1981 to 1988
sample period. Second, for each pair of banks, we perform an f-test, whose null hypothesis
is that all the model’s coefficient estimates of the pair of banks are identical. The resulting
f-statistic serves as a measurement of how different a pair of banks are from each other.
Under the null hypothesis, if both banks respond similarly to all factors, the f-statistic
should be zero. Otherwise, the size of the f-statistic approximately indicates the
dissimilarity of banks’ sensitivity to the factors. We perform this test on all combination of
banks in our sample. We use these f-test results to form a lower triangular matrix. A
typical element  (i, j), where i < j, stores the f-statistic from the mentioned hypothesis
testing between bank i and bank j.
We use the matrix of f-statistics as a distance matrix for the clustering procedure.
We use Ward’s minimum variance clustering procedure. This procedure is a part of
SAS/ETS software package. Ward’s minimum variance method belongs to a class of
hierarchical clustering procedures. In short, the procedure attempts to group a number of
observations so as to minimize the objective function, which equals the summation of
variance of intra-cluster distance. The minimization routine works iteratively. During each
iteration, the procedure combines any two existing clusters that produces the smallest
value of the objective function. At the end of each iteration, the number of clusters is
reduced by one. The procedure continues until the number of clusters equals one. Since
the procedure stores the clustering outcomes of all iterations, we obtain our result by
simply recording the outputs from the iteration where the number of resulting clusters is
ten.23
Time-series Model Fitting
We use the Box-Jenkins framework to fit time-series models to our data series. We
use Schwarz’s information criterion to determine the best fitted model. We perform the
model selection procedure during the 60-month period between November 1975 to
October 1980. The model fitting period does not immediately precede our sample period.
The reason for this gap is the two-month reporting lag in the leading indicator data series.
We use the chosen models to construct series of forecasts of all independent
variables. While the model specifications remain fixed throughout the sample period, we
re-estimate the parameters of the models using the sample from a 60-month period
immediately prior to the data points we wish to produce forecasts. This 60-month moving
window allows us to produce series of forecasts for our 1981 to 1988 sample period.
In choosing the time-series specification, we require that we be able to estimate the
models for all periods in our sample. This requirement causes us to drop the best fitted
model for the liquidity risk premium series. The final model for this series is in fact the
third best fitted model. In this case, we are unable to estimate the parameters of the better
fitted models in some periods in our sample. The following lists the models we fit to our
data series.
Data series Time-series model
Leading indicator AR(2)
20-year Treasury bond holding period return MA(1)
3-month Treasury bill yield AR(2)
Credit risk premium AR(1)
Term premium ARMA(1,1)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RATE OF RETURN REGRESSIONS (TWO-FACTOR MODEL)
JANUARY 1981 THROUGH DECEMBER 1988
Portfolio





















































































































































































2 0.75 0.67 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.61 0.60 0.36 0.40 0.07
Durbin Watson 2.17 2.11 2.04 1.91 2.05 2.22 2.01 2.53 2.45 2.01
Average monthly
return (%)
1.07 2.41 1.50 1.88 2.15 0.31 3.17 -1.88 -0.96 4.73
Standard deviation 5.60 5.17 4.92 4.72 5.15 7.02 6.99 10.49 8.92 20.11
Number of banks 167 22 34 31 42 13 11 7 3 3 1
Note: *     denotes significance at 10% level
**   denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level26
TABLE 3. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RATE OF RETURN REGRESSIONS (MULTI-FACTOR MODEL)
JANUARY 1981 THROUGH DECEMBER 1988
Portfolio
















































































































































































































































































TABLE 3 (CONT.). FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RATE OF RETURN REGRESSIONS
JANUARY 1981 THROUGH DECEMBER 1988
Portfolio
mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10























































































































































































































2 0.73 0.66 0.52 0.63 0.35 0.59 0.64 0.70 0.73 0.57
Durbin Watson 2.08 1.93 1.78 2.04 1.85 2.36 2.25 2.23 2.17 2.12
Average monthly
return (%)
1.73 1.71 2.00 1.94 1.55 -0.34 1.35 1.37 1.69 3.40
Standard deviation 5.90 5.45 3.92 4.54 3.07 7.36 11.52 11.88 7.74 9.34
Number of banks 167 36 23 16 34 20 9 9 4 11 5
Note: *     denotes significance at 10% level
**   denotes significance at 5% level























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 5. CLASSIFICATIONS OF  FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BY PORTFOLIOS
AS COMPARED TO STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION  CODE, RESULTS FROM 2-FACTOR MODEL
Portfolio 6021 6022 6035 6036 6099 6111 6141 6162 6199 6211 6282 Total
1 11 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 22
2 14 13 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 34
3 14 8 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 4 0 31
4 25 10 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 42
5 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 13
6 6 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
7 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 7
8 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
9 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 81 43 5 10 1 1 3 1 11 8 3 167
Depository institutions
6021 Nationally charted commercial banks
6022 State chartered commercial banks
6035 Federally charted savings institutions
6036 State charted savings institutions
6099 Functions related to depository banking not elsewhere classified
Non-depository credit institutions
6111 Federal and federally sponsored credit agencies
6141 Personal credit institutions
6162 Mortgage bankers and loan correspondents
Security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges and services
6211 Security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies
6282 Investment advice
Others
6199 Financial servicesTable 6. Composition of the Ten Portfolios
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Portfolio 1
Colorado Natl Bankshares     6021
First Interstate Bancorp     6021
Sterling Bancorp/NY          6021
First Commerce Corp          6021
Chase Manhattan Corp         6021
Manufacturers Hanover Corp   6021
Southeast Banking Corp       6021
Union Planters Corp          6021
U S Bancorp                  6021
Valley National Corp Arizona 6021
Zions Bancorporation         6021
First Security Corp/DE       6022
Mark Twain Bancshares        6022
West One Bancorp             6022
Sumitomo Bank of California  6022
First Westn Finl Corp        6035
Western Savings & Loan Assoc 6036
Advance Ross Corp            6099
ITT Corp                     6199
Acceptance Insurance Cos Inc 6199
Salomon Inc                  6211
Integrated Resources Inc     6211
Portfolio 2
Synovus Financial Cp        6021
Central Fidelity Banks Inc  6021
Corestates Financial Corp   6021
First Of America Bank Corp  6021
First Maryland Bancorp      6021
INB Financial Cp            6021
Fleet Financial Group Inc   6021
Wells Fargo & Co            6021
Manufacturers National Corp 6021
UJB Finl Corp               6021
Signet Banking Corp         6021
NBD Bancorp Inc             6021
Security Bancorp Inc/MI     6021
Southtrust Corp             6021
Associated Banc-Corp        6022
Banponce Corp               6022
Baybanks Inc                6022
Central Jersey Bancorp      6022
Dauphin Deposit Corp        6022
Equitable Bancorporation    6022
Fifth Third Bancorp         6022
First Hawaiian Inc          6022
Lincoln Financial Corp      6022
Merchants N Y Bancorp Inc   6022
Ramapo Finl Corp            6022
Santa Monica Bk Calif       6022
U S Trust Corp             6022
Golden West Financial Corp 6035
Ahmanson (H F) & Co        6035
Downey Savings & Loan Assc 6036
Federal Natl Mortgage Assn 6111
Acmat Corp                 6199
Loews Corp                 6199
Riverside Group Inc        6199
Portfolio 3
Boatmens Bancshares Inc     6021
Brenton Bks Inc             6021
Community Natl Bancorp      6021
Deposit Guaranty Corp       6021
Florida Natl Banks Of Fla   6021
Norwest Corp                6021
Citicorp                    6021
Chemical Banking Corp       6021
Mercantile Bancorporation   6021
Meridian Bancorp Inc        6021
First Chicago Corp          6021
Republic New York Corp      6021
Riggs Natl Corp Wash D C    6021
Sunwest Finl Services Inc   6021
Banks of Iowa               6022
Union Bank San Francisco    6022
Dominion Bankshares Corp    6022
Jefferson Bancorp Inc       6022
Bankers Trust New York Corp 6022
Old Stone Corp              6022
Trustcorp Inc               6022
Transworld Bancorp Calif    6022
Great Western Financial     6035
Mercury Savings & Loan Assc 6036
Lomas Financial Cp          6162
TransAmerica Corp           6199
Equitable of Iowa Cos       6199
Merrill Lynch & Co          6211
Paine Webber Group          6211
Realamerica Co              6211
Ziegler Co Inc              6211
Bank South Corp             6021
Citizens & Southern Corp-Ga 6021Table 6. Composition of the Ten Portfolios
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Portfolio 4
Great Western Financial      6035
Golden West Financial Corp   6035
Ahmanson (H F) & Co          6035
Imperial Corp of America     6036
Financial Corp-Santa Barbara 6036
Downey Savings & Loan Assc   6036
Federal Natl Mortgage Assn   6111
City National Corp         6021
Commerce Bancshares Inc    6021
F & M Natl Corp            6021
First American Corp/TN     6021
Trustmark Corp             6021
First Commercial Corp      6021
First Florida Banks Inc    6021
Star Banc Corp             6021
First Tennessee Natl Corp  6021
Firstier Financial Inc     6021
Fourth Financial Corp      6021
Hibernia Corp  -Cl A       6021
Huntington Bancshares      6021
Bank of Boston Corp        6021
First Fid Bancorporation   6021
Merchants National Corp    6021
Firstar Corp               6021
Michigan National Corp     6021
Midlantic Corp             6021
Security Pacific Corp      6021
Southern National Corp     6021
Crestar Financial Corp     6021
Valley Bancorporation/WI   6021
Ameritrust Corp            6022
Bancorp Hawaii Inc         6022
Chittenden Corp            6022
Morgan (J.P.) & Co         6022
Bank Of New York Co Inc    6022
First Pennsylvania Corp    6022
Northern Trust Corp        6022
Barnett Banks Inc          6022
Puget Sound Bancorp        6022
United Carolina Bancshares 6022
Landmark Land Co           6036
Miw Investors-Washington   6036
Beneficial Corp 6141
Sunamerica Inc 6199
Re Capital Corp 6199
Edwards (A.G.) Inc         6211
American Express           6211
Portfolio 5
Compass Bancshares Inc      6021
Liberty National Bancorp/KY 6021
Marshall & Ilsley Corp      6021
Nationsbank Corp            6021
South Carolina Natl Corp    6021
CCB Financial Corp          6022
Comerica Inc                6022
First Virginia Banks Inc    6022
Mercantile Bankshares Corp  6022
Old Kent Financial Corp     6022
Household International Inc 6141
Midland Co                  6199
Pioneer Group Inc           6282
Portfolio 6
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc     6021
Hawkeye Bancorporation       6021
Equimark Corp                6021
Continental Bank Corp        6021
BankAmerica Corp             6021
United Banks of Colorado     6021
Affiliated Bankshares Colo   6022
Olympus Cap Corp             6035
Imperial Corp of America     6036
Financial Corp-Santa Barbara 6036
Transcapital Financial Corp  6036
Portfolio 7
National Comm Bancorp/TN    6021
Citizens Fst Bancorp Inc/NJ 6021
State Street Boston Corp    6022
Wilmington Trust Corp       6022
Leucadia National Corp      6199
Eaton Vance Corp            6282
Dreyfus Corp                6282
Portfolio 8
Liberty Bancorp Inc OK 6021
Mcorp                  6021
American Century Corp  6036
Portfolio 9
American Bancorp/OH 6021
Bancoklahoma Corp   6021
Gibraltar Financial Corp 6036
Portfolio 10
Cencor Inc 6141